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Executive Summary 
Over the last decade, the European Union has been hit by multiple crises of various kinds. Although the corona-
virus pandemic, with its health, social and economic consequences, currently dominates policy perception and 
action in Europe, it is only the latest in a series of challenges. The EU's limited ability to respond effectively to 
such challenges has highlighted the need for reform. The project "A strong Europe in a globalized world" propos-
es to advance the reform process by means of the concept of European public goods. In the present paper, we 
provide a definition of this concept and illustrate its potential in the debate on future models for a stronger and 
more sovereign Europe.  
The concept of European public goods draws on the welfare-economic concept of public goods (or common 
goods). In contrast to private goods, public goods justify the provision of services by the state when at least one 
of the following forms of market failures occurs: no rivalry between buyers, no exclusion of individual consumers, 
natural monopoly.  
Within a federal system, public goods can be provided by different levels of government. The theory of fiscal fed-
eralism offers an economic approach for the allocation of tasks to different government levels of a federal state. 
Applied to the EU - which is not yet a federal state, but has gone far beyond the confederation of states -, it en-
tails that a public good should be provided by the central level if the following criteria are met: Europe-wide 
benefits, Europe-wide homogeneous preferences among the inhabitants of the Community and most cost-
effective realization at the European level due to economies of scale. In this case, we speak of European public 
goods. 
However, the above three criteria could point in opposite directions and, thus, provide no clear-cut argument for 
or against the Europeanization of a public task. A weighing up decision is then necessary. This could be support-
ed, for example, by a cost-benefit analysis, which derives the European added value of a public good by first 
determining for each criterion the difference between the benefits of the European and national provision, and 
then aggregating the resulting three "partial net benefits" into an "overall net benefit". Such a procedure meets not 
only the inherently important requirement of justifying shifts of competence as well as possible, but also the de-
mand for political transparency. 
The concept of European public goods described here presupposes that, in order to increase the Community's 
capability to act, the right task priorities must first be set for the respective time and problem context. Today more 
than ever, it is important that each level of government in Europe takes on the public tasks for which it is best 
suited. In recent years, the Union's current field of action has been increasingly assessed in the light of the theory 
of fiscal federalism. An overview of the findings suggests that the EU’s financially relevant action priorities focus 
too much on regional or even local public goods and too little on European public goods. 
A successful implementation of the concept also requires that consideration be given to how to get there. From 
today's perspective, three aspects in particular are important for the further analysis: (i) the governance issues 
associated with the catchword "connectivity" arising from the provision of European public goods within a multi-
level system; (ii) the creation of new financial leeway for European public goods already within the next multi-
annual financial framework 2021-2027; (iii) breaking the alleged taboo of treaty changes. 
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A. Introduction 
European integration is currently confronted with several crises affecting key policy 
areas. Since spring 2020, the coronavirus pandemic, with its health, social and eco-
nomic consequences, has dominated European policy perception and action. The 
scale of this crisis could overshadow the other problems. However, Europe’s further 
challenges have certainly not disappeared because of Covid-19, at best they are tem-
porarily in a dormant state. Some crisis factors have even become more acute, while 
problem-solving capabilities need to focus on the pandemic. At the forefront are the re-
emerging Brexit crisis and the ongoing rule-of-law crisis, the latter exemplifying a partly 
fully-blown, partly burgeoning populism crisis. But also the other latent crises in Europe 
awaiting a solution could flare up again at any time - in particular, the refugee crisis, 
the terrorism crisis, the Ukraine crisis and, last but not least, the Eurozone crisis, which 
was not resolved before the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic and which is wors-
ening again in the wake of the current recession.1 These events, with their economic 
and social implications, have contributed to fuel widespread scepticism towards the 
European institutions - or at least their ability to deliver - which is gradually undermin-
ing their political legitimacy. 
Multiple crises... 
Crises are nothing new in the European integration process.The dense concentration 
of crises in times of Covid 19 is nevertheless unique. The European Union (EU), in its 
present form, is the result of a process in which it has evolved in response to prevailing 
economic and political challenges. Today, Europe is once again called upon to cope 
with multiple crises. This was already the subject of intense discussion before the 
coronavirus pandemic; the latest crisis has further heightened the urgency of the re-
form debate. Although there is a general consensus that Europe needs reform, there is 
little agreement on the direction to take. 
...and multiple 
reform wishes  
As Thöne and Kreuter (2020) show, the solution space is already filled with a number 
of models. Reform proposals are often presented as an alternative between "more 
Europe" or "less Europe". On the one hand, there are those who call for the transfer of 
more competences to the EU. On the other hand, others want to secure Member 
States their competences and advocate a shifting back of competences. 
More or less 
Europe? 
However, as Tabellini stressed as early as 2002, the key problem of the EU when it 
comes to such matters lies in the definition of the Union’s tasks within the existing Eu-
ropean legal framework and beyond. The scope of EU tasks needs to be redefined 
from time to time in view of the specific time and problem context. In order to create 
broader acceptance for European policy through high problem-solving capability, new 
task allocation should be guided by criteria of efficient centralisation - which at the 
same time is also efficient decentralisation. The discussion about a redefinition of Eu-
ropean tasks on the basis of economic efficiency criteria gains new impetus under the 
heading of European public goods.  
New layout for EU 
tasks 
                                                     
1  For an overview of the external and internal challenges facing Europe today, see Paper 2 of this Series: M. Thöne and H. Kreuter 
(2020), “New models for Europe’s future: scoping of tasks and approaches”, Vision Europe Project, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh and 
Berlin.  
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Research based on the theory of fiscal federalism has repeatedly shown that the cur-
rent EU tasks and the resulting spending priorities are at odds with these criteria. 
Distorted incentives in the budgetary process lead to a sub-optimal allocation of re-
sponsibilities between the EU and its Member States (Heinemann, 2016). As a result, 
the EU’s financially relevant action priorities focus too much on regional or even local 
public goods and too little on European public goods. 
More European, 
less local goods 
The need to adjust task and spending priorities seems all the more important given the 
structural budget gap expected with Brexit. This gap, caused by the departure of the 
fourth largest contributor to the EU budget after Germany, France and Italy, will 
amount to about 13 billion euros per year. In 2020 such fiscal issues will seemingly be 
put into perspective by the budget holes torn by the coronavirus pandemic and reces-
sion. De facto, however, the need for medium-term consolidation and the need for 
structural renewal of European funding add up. 
Corona and Brexit 
tear budget holes 
In a way, despite and because of Covid 19, there is today a real opportunity to tackle 
these problems. Even before the pandemic, European policy actors from several 
Member States were expressing a growing willingness to prioritise European public 
goods, as illustrated by the German-Italian (Altmaier and Padoan, 2018) and Franco-
German (Lamy and Weizsäcker, 2018) proposals for restructuring the EU budget. With 
the pandemic and in the ensuing changed world, the Union and its Member States will 
all the more need to act efficiently and decisively. Only if all actors become more effec-
tive than they are today and mutual blockades are avoided will Europe be able to 
master its still growing challenges. It is necessary to overcome together and simulta-
neously the most serious economic plight since the end of the war, to push ahead 
more vigorously with the necessary transformations into digitalisation as well as cli-
mate and resource protection, and finally to make Europe a sovereign player in an 
increasingly multipolar world (Ebert and Schmidt, 2020). Because Europe will only be 
capable to act externally if it is also strong internally, new models for the allocation of 
tasks according to the criteria of European common goods play an important role. To-
day more than ever, it is crucial that each level of government in Europe concentrates 
on the tasks for which it is best suited. 
The negotiations on the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the years 2021 to 
2027 offer a good starting point for reform. In 2018 the European Commission submit-
ted a first MFF proposal that in part already addressed the strengthening of European 
public goods. The new MFF proposals presented at the end of May 2020 against the 
background of the coronavirus pandemic go even further. Although the agreement 
reached by the European Council in July 2020 provides in turn for cuts in some key 
areas (e.g. Horizon 2020, Digital Europe), it still represents a first step towards re-
balancing EU tasks. Overall, however, it should be noted that the emerging further 
European development is mainly due to the fight against the pandemic through the 
large recovery fund financed via joint debt. 
Europe indeed tends to change more often and more thoroughly under crisis condi-
tions than in good times. In the remainder of 2020 and in 2021, attention must be paid 
to the fact that the forthcoming adjustments to the European model will not exclusively 
be shaped by a successful management of the coronavirus crisis. At the same time, 
Real chance to 
tackle the problems 
European Public Goods: Their contribution to a strong Europe | Page 7 
 
this real opportunity must be seized to tackle structural problems and achieve a more 
capable-to-act and sovereign Union, both internally and externally. At the heart of this 
agenda can be the concept of European public goods - as a concept for a strong Eu-
rope. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. First, we outline the competences of the 
EU according to the European treaties. This is followed by a description of the basic 
economic concepts underlying European public goods: "public goods" (Section C) and 
"European goods" (Section D). After a brief glance at the current EU budget (Section 
E), we examine the policy fields that should be considered first for Europeanisation 
(Section F). The paper concludes with a few remarks as to which questions are likely 
to become essential for further discussion from a fiscal and budgetary perspective. 
 
 
B. Competences of the European Union 
According to the principle of conferral enshrined in Article 5 of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) “(…) the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences con-
ferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out 
therein”. The EU cannot therefore identify and exercise competences on its own; a 
treaty mandate is always required. 
 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) divides EU competences 
into three main categories: 
 
 exclusive competences: Only the EU is entitled to legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts. 
 shared competences: The Member States can legislate and adopt legally bind-
ing acts if the EU has not done so. 
 supporting competences: The EU has only the right to support, coordinate or 
supplement actions of the Member States. It cannot adopt legally binding acts 
requiring Member States to harmonise their laws or regulations. 
 
Three categories of 
competences 
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The EU has exclusive legislative competence in only a few areas (Article 3 TFEU): 
customs union, setting competition rules for the internal market, monetary policy for the 
Member States of the eurozone, conserving marine biological resources under the 
common fisheries policy, the common commercial policy and - under certain conditions 
- concluding international agreements. These are mostly areas sometimes referred to 
as “negative freedoms” in the common Europe: the Union provides European services 
by safeguarding residents and businesses in the single market from national (competi-
tion) barriers. The exclusive competences of the Union play a subordinate role on the 
expenditure side of the European budget, as they mainly involve regulatory instru-
ments or - in the case of the customs union – revenue-side instruments. 
Negative freedoms 
Legislative powers shared with the Member States, on the other hand, cover a wider 
range of policy areas (Article 4 TFEU), as depicted in Figure 1. Compared to exclusive 
legislative competences, these policy areas are also largely implemented through EU 
budget expenditures. 
Shared 
competences 
Everything else is regulated at the national level, although possibly with the help of the 
EU (Article 6 TFEU). Exceptions are the coordination of economic, employment and 
social policies and the common foreign and security policy, to which specific proce-
dures apply (Article 5 TFEU). 
National 
competences 
The exercise of the above mentioned Union competences is limited by two comple-
mentary principles. All types of competences are subject to the principle of 
proportionality, according to which EU action “shall not exceed what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the Treaties” (Article 5 TEU).  
Principle of 
proportionality 
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For non-exclusive competences, the principle of subsidiarity also provides that the EU 
“shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be suffi-
ciently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local 
level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level” (Article 5 TEU). Decisions should therefore be taken at the 
lowest possible political level. EU institutions should only step in when they promise to 
act more effectively or more efficiently.  
Subsidiarity 
principle 
C. Public goods and government tasks 
The concept of public goods or common goods is traditionally used in public economics to 
justify government activity as such in a market economy system and to identify areas 
where the collective provision of goods and services is preferable to market provision. 
Building on this, the economic theory of fiscal federalism has developed criteria as to 
which state level should best provide which public services. 
Public goods as 
narrative for 
state tasks  
A new narrative of strengthening the EU and its Member States through the enforced pro-
vision of European common goods draws on these basic economic notions. It is important 
to know the strengths of the concept and the related democratic and economic ad-
vantages. Equally important it will be to point out the limits of this concept with a view to 
further European development. In a social market economy, the provision of public goods 
offers also at the national level a good narrative for welfare-enhancing government action. 
Here, however, the concept cannot always be translated into clearly applicable criteria as 
to when and how exactly actual government action is allocatively efficient in this sense. 
The distinction between general justification and reliable criteria will also play an important 
role for European public goods. 
In accordance with neoclassical economics, textbooks define public goods as the opposite 
of private goods. The latter can be well provided via competitive markets. If the market 
conditions for the supply and demand of private goods are not guaranteed, the state has a 
subsidiary obligation to intervene. Goods can be well provided via decentralised markets if 
(a) they are “rival” in consumption, (b) others can be excluded from consuming them and 
(c) competition with several suppliers is possible on the relevant market. If these conditions 
are not met in whole or in part, market failure occurs. Public goods are defined ex negativo 
from this market failure. Their provision by the public sector - in place of the market - is 
indispensable or at least more efficient. A pure public good has two key characteristics, 
both of which entail market failure: non-rivalry in consumption (Samuelson, 1954) and non-
excludability in consumption (Musgrave, 1959). 
Three 
conditions for 
public goods 
Non-excludability means that no one can be prevented from using an available public 
good. Classical examples are street lighting and a clean environment. The fact that nobody 
can be excluded from consumption induces the selfish economic actor to wait for others to 
provide the good and then participate in its use free of charge. Yet, since every actor has 
this incentive to free ride and therefore waits tactically, no market demand arises, even 
though the goods would actually be desirable. 
Non-
excludability 
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Non-rivalry, on the other hand, means that different individuals can consume a common 
good at the same time without diminishing each other's benefits. Involving additional users 
will not incur any extra costs. Here, too, there are incentives for economic actors to tacti-
cally downplay their interest in consuming the good and their willingness to pay for it. 
Hence, the price mechanism cannot work and no efficient market comes about.  
Non-rivalry 
Most public goods are not pure in the sense that they fulfil both of the above properties 
simultaneously: impure public goods are either non-rival ("club goods") or non-excludable 
("the commons"). Impure public goods, too, must either be provided directly by the state or 
their market provision must be regulated and possibly supported by the state. A more gen-
eral way of looking at impure public goods (also known as "mixed goods"), which is very 
relevant to practical government activity, is via externalities. For certain goods, market 
failure is partial rather than total, because non-excludability and/or non-rivalry relate only to 
certain features of a good or its production process. 
Mixed goods 
Goods and services with positive externalities create benefits for uninvolved third parties. 
Such “spillover” benefits to third parties are welcome and increase overall social welfare. 
However, as these externalities occur on the side and do not involve any compensation, 
they are not taken into account by market suppliers. Therefore, from the point of view of 
society as a whole, a purely market-based supply would provide too little of the service 
concerned. Common examples of activities with positive externalities are private research 
and development: indeed, even the best patent protection cannot stop good ideas from 
spreading. Nor would it be sensible to prevent such positive externalities from unfolding. 
Public goods and positive externalities are closely related: the higher the share of external 
benefits in the overall societal benefit of a service, the closer the service comes to a public 
good. A service with one hundred percent positive external benefits is a pure common 
good. Conversely, only a good with one hundred percent “internal” benefits is a pure pri-
vate good. The broad spectrum between these pure forms points to many justifications for 
weaker or stronger interventions in market processes on the ground of common benefit 
considerations. 
External effects: 
positive 
spillovers 
The partial market failure of goods and processes with negative externalities is also of 
great practical relevance for government action: in this case, the market exchange produc-
es as a side-effect adverse consequences for uninvolved third parties. Classic examples 
are environmental pollution and climate damage caused by private activities, without the 
resulting harmful effects being reflected in the cost calculation and thus in the market price. 
While in the case of positive externalities the pure market supply provides too little of the 
services concerned from the perspective of society as a whole, negative spillovers have 
the opposite effect. The free interplay of supply and demand leads to a market supply that 
is too high in comparison to the overall social optimum. Government action against this 
form of market failure is aimed at reducing, regulating or even preventing market provision. 
Again, different proportions of external costs to the costs of a good considered in the mar-
ket process are conceivable. Activities with (almost) one hundred percent external costs 
are sometimes referred to as pure “bads”. However, it would be more obvious to speak 
directly of a burden or an evil. 
Negative 
externalities and 
bads 
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The conceptual charm of regarding the allocative activities of the state primarily as dealing 
with positive and negative externalities also lies in the fact that not only economically con-
sistent justifications for state action are given or demanded here. The analysis also 
provides guidance on which instruments would be better suited to address market failure 
most efficiently. In the case of positive externalities, purely market-based provision gener-
ally leads to goods being offered in too small a quantity and, thus, at too high unit costs. 
The optimal instrument for internalising these externalities is often subsidies, which can 
increase the earnings of suppliers to such an extent that they produce the good concerned 
in the "right" (i.e. higher) amount for society as a whole.  Internalisation 
of externalities 
 
Conversely, negative externalities call for internalising taxes that drive up prices of harmful 
activities until their benefits and costs are in an optimal relationship from the perspective of 
society as a whole. In this respect, environmental protection subsidies and environmental 
taxes, for example, are by no means equivalent instruments for resource protection. Both 
change the relative price between environmentally harmful and environmentally friendly 
behaviour in the direction of internalising external costs. Yet, only environmental taxes 
raise the "unnaturally" low price of environmental damage due to negative externalities 
and, thus, change the absolute price in the right direction.  
Finally, the concept of externalities pursued to the end also provides a bridge to non-
market instruments for correcting market failures. For example, if the negative externalities 
of an activity far exceed the market-relevant costs and prices, then the internalising tax is 
an unreasonable alternative to a simple ban. An extreme example illustrates this best: 
there exists a “market” even (or especially) for the hunting of animals directly threatened 
with extinction. In this example, the market-conform instrument of an (exorbitantly) high 
species-protection tax would be a bad choice in comparison to a simple ban reinforced by 
severe sanctions. A similar conclusion emerges from the legal assessment of these in-
struments: legally, taxes intended to stifle an activity are regarded as an illegal abuse of 
statutory forms. Economically they are inefficient: whoever wants to ban should ban and 
not take expensive detours.  
Bans? 
Statutory regulation is not only in extreme situations a permanent alternative to economic 
instruments that, in the form of subsidies or taxes, aim at direct price effects. The introduc-
tion of regulations as instrumental alternatives2 automatically adds a second dimension to 
the efficiency analysis: along with allocative efficiency targeted at correcting market fail-
ures, the direct operational efficiency of government action is now also at stake.  
Regulation as 
an economic 
instrument 
A third form of market failure is the so-called "natural monopoly": due to economies of 
scale in the production of a good, a single supplier can produce more cost-effectively on 
the relevant market than two or even more suppliers. The free interplay of supply and de-
mand leads to a supplier monopoly in such markets. In order to protect consumers from 
monopolistic exploitation with excessively high prices and poor supply of goods, the provi-
sion of services by the state - or the strict regulation of private sector production - can be 
beneficial to the welfare of society as a whole even in the case of private goods.  
Natural 
monopolies 
                                                     
2  Historically, bans, commandments and the numerous regulatory stages in-between are of course much older than market-oriented 
instruments such as subsidies or internalising taxes.  
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Economies of scale can also arise on the demand side; this is often the case with network 
externalities. A network becomes all the more useful for everyone involved the more actors 
participate in it. This is how "winner takes it all"-markets for providers come about. Monop-
olisation tendencies e.g. in social networks or messenger services illustrate this effect. In 
long-established networks (e.g. electricity, drinking water, roads), services are often pro-
vided directly by the state. As technology progresses, such networks may sometimes be 
reconverted into state-regulated competitive markets. Examples include fixed-line tele-
phone networks, electricity and gas supply, and rail transport.  
Network 
externalities 
The above outlined simple taxonomy of public goods and state activities justified by exter-
nalities or monopolies does not cover the entire spectrum of public activities. According to 
the traditional classification, which dates back to Richard Musgrave, these allocative tasks 
are supplemented by stabilisation policy and redistribution policy. Both are again geared to 
deficits in decentralised markets, albeit from very different perspectives. Stabilisation policy 
is intended to counter economic volatility and its consequences for employment and in-
vestment. The redistribution of income among individuals and private households, on the 
other hand, concerns a dimension that markets and decentralised coordination mecha-
nisms cannot achieve from the outset. Even functioning markets do not necessarily lead to 
outcomes that meet the socially prevailing goal of social justice. Here, in line with the eco-
nomic paradigm, the state has a duty to intervene correctively in the distribution of income 
and wealth. As actual markets do not automatically lead to non-discriminatory outcomes 
either, this area further includes the establishment of equal opportunities by preventing 
discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or gender identity. 
Allocation and 
stabilisation 
 
Distribution  
and equity 
As already mentioned, public goods and occasions for state intervention are economically 
justified ex negativo: wherever markets - or other forms of decentralised coordination in the 
family, circle of friends, neighbourhood, religious community and other free associations - 
do not function or lead to visibly unsatisfactory results, the state is called upon to act. The 
entire understanding of the state is subsidiary. 
Understanding 
of the state ex 
negativo 
This residual understanding of the state entails a broad and very heterogeneous spectrum 
of tasks for the public sector. None of these duties has arisen from a positive definition of 
state tasks. In other words, the provision of common goods and other public services is 
ascribed to the state, without it being known a priori whether and how well it can provide 
these services. The economic literature is rich in theoretical and empirical evidence that 
hierarchical and collective decision-making mechanisms - as typical within democracies - 
are by no means a guarantee that public services would always be provided in the best 
possible quality and quantity. In the residual heterogeneous field of state tasks, an "optimal 
budget" (Mackscheidt, 1973) with throughout efficient provision of all public goods is hardly 
attainable.3 
Subsidiary and 
residual 
Of course, this does not mean that the state should limit itself to fulfilling only those tasks, 
that it can handle well. The numerous proofs of its often unsatisfactory performance com-
pared to the economic ideal - ranging from Arrow's famous impossibility theorem to the 
The subsidiary 
state is both 
restrained and 
                                                     
3  To avoid misunderstandings: the evidence for state services provided under non-democratic conditions is even worse. This is 
particularly true when the needs and preferences of people are taken as the yardstick for necessary and wished-for government 
services. In the absence of the mechanisms of free, equal and regular elections, there is no indispensable forum in which the demand 
for collective goods can develop at all.  
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daily anecdotal observation of "government failure" - do not alter at all the book of govern-
ment tasks. Market participants can call for the state to intervene if they fail. The subsidiary 
state, however, cannot call upon the market or the individual, because it only intervenes 
when decentralised coordination via markets or civil society reaches its limits. The subsidi-
ary state is both restrained and latently responsible for everything. 
universally 
responsible 
Yet, the subsidiarity principle does not only reflect the concept of public goods. In addition 
to the question of which goods and services the state should provide, it also helps to ad-
dress the question of which government layer in a multi-level system should decide upon 
and provide a service. Thus, the subsidiarity principle also plays an important role in the 
definition of European public goods.  
Which level 
does what? 
D. Criteria for European public goods  
 
Each public good scatters its benefits more or less far in space. A streetlight, the textbook 
example of a local public good, makes light only up to a few dozen metres away. Every 
tonne of greenhouse gas that is saved has, on the other hand, a pervasive global effect. 
The spatial dispersion of the benefits of public goods and publicly provided mixed goods 
lies between these two poles. In the Europe of the four fundamental freedoms, national 
borders no longer automatically delimit the extent to which public infrastructures and other 
services exert their effect and spread their benefits. When applied to the spatial dimension, 
the doctrine of public goods becomes the theory of fiscal federalism.  
From local to 
global public 
goods 
This theory offers an economic approach for the allocation of tasks to different levels of a 
federal state. Although the European Union is no longer a confederation of states, but not 
yet a federal state either – the literature speaks of a "federal entity", the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (1993) of a "federation of states" –, the spatially oriented doctrine of 
public goods can easily be applied to it as well. 
Actually, the theory of fiscal federalism does not only provide guidance on how public tasks 
can be apportioned among the existing levels of government. Just as well – if not even 
better, because more precise – it can be used to identify the ideal spatial extension for 
certain public goods and to define a tailor-made public service unit for them.4 From a sim-
ple economic perspective, these are two sides of the same coin. If, on the other hand, 
historical, political and legal framework conditions are taken into account, the question of 
whether one thinks in terms of the common good or in terms of the existing level of gov-
ernment gains considerable weight. As will become clear later, this is particularly true for 
European public goods and European integration. 
The right 
government 
level for each 
public good 
At the heart of the theory of fiscal federalism are again externalities, which are considered 
here in their spatial dimension. Spatial externalities are regarded as a sign of deficits in the 
supply structure of public services. If a service is provided by a government level whose 
territory is significantly smaller than the extent to which the public benefit of the service 
Spillover effects 
determine the 
proper 
government 
layer 
                                                     
4  In the political science theory, the distinction between "federalism" and "functionalism" is based on this logical sequence. Under 
functionalism, public service units are set up for public goods; under ideal-type federalism, public goods are allocated to existing 
government levels as “aptly” as possible. See Kreuter and Thöne (2020). 
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scatters (see Figure 2, centre), these “benefit spillovers” can lead to mismanagement in 
two respects. On the one hand, the "too decentralised" public provider does not take into 
account the wider dispersion of the service’s benefits, so that too little of the service is 
provided. It may also be that the quality and differentiation of the service do not meet the 
needs of what is actually a large user group. On the other hand, only members of the "too 
decentralised" government level are involved in the tax financing of the public service, 
entailing an unfair burden-sharing that does not reflect the true dispersion of the benefits. 
As a result, it quickly comes to an undersupply of the public service concerned. 
Examples of “too decentralised” tasks are cultural facilities in large cities, such as muse-
ums or operas, which are also frequented by the inhabitants of the surrounding area or the 
wider region. Moreover, nature conservation in rural regions, which causes local (oppor-
tunity) costs by foregoing intensive land use, is another example of benefit spillovers. The 
existential and recreational value of nature accrues to more people than the direct inhabit-
ants alone. Nature conservation policies implemented exclusively at the local level would 
probably be weaker and more prone to compromise than those implemented at a higher 
level. With a view to European public goods, benefit spillovers from services provided at a 
too decentralised level (here the national level) are the key economic starting point for 
greater Europeanisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
Europeanisation 
of too 
decentralised 
tasks 
The counterpart to a “too decentralised” provision is a “too central” provision. In the latter 
case, the circle of users is noticeably smaller than the circle of those who decide on the 
service and finance it (see Figure 2, left). This violation of the subsidiarity principle not only 
leads to unfair burden-sharing as non-users have to co-finance the provision of a service 
and are allowed to co-decide on it. A too central decision also becomes allocatively ineffi-
cient by virtue of the fact that it is not only those affected who decide on the quantity and 
quality of the public service. The multi-level governance system, with its distribution of 
power between federal, regional and local government tiers, can show its strengths par-
ticularly well when the services demanded by citizens differ among local units. Such 
heterogeneous preferences can be better met if decentralised government levels enable 
such a differentiation without further ado. 
“Too 
centralised” 
tasks 
 
 
 
 
Heterogeneous 
preferences 
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From the perspective of spatial externalities, the ideal level for providing a public good is 
therefore the one that can guarantee fiscal equivalence (see Figure 2, right). According to 
the correspondence principle derived from this fiscal equivalence, the provision of a public 
good should be assigned to the government level, where decision-makers, users and (tax) 
payers coincide. 
Correspon-
dence principle 
In addition to finding the government tier in the multi-level governance system that best 
suits the structure of demand for a public good, there is also the consideration of econo-
mies of scale on the supply side. The so-called economies of scale can, as illustrated 
above, justify public provision of a good in order to prevent the concentration of power of a 
“natural monopoly” in private hands. From a federal perspective, this consideration goes 
one step further: the (already) public options to provide a service through different levels of 
government are compared with each other. It’s no longer a matter of justifying state inter-
vention as such; but of making a simple comparison between production technologies. 
Just as a large factory for a conventional consumer good can achieve lower unit costs than 
many small manufacturing plants due to economies of scale, so a central government unit 
can provide the same quality and quantity of a service at lower costs in the presence of 
economies of scale. Economies of scale often also play a role in the fiscal federalism 
framework when the costs of a public undertaking become so large that they are perceived 
politically as a natural monopoly. A striking example is space travel and its joint implemen-
tation in Europe as well as internationally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economies of 
scale 
For the concept of European common goods, positive economies of scale in particular play 
a potentially important role. However, negative economies of scale should not be ruled out 
from the outset. So-called diseconomies of scale occur when the optimal size for imple-
menting public services is exceeded and the "big is beautiful" judgement is turned on its 
head. Diseconomies of scale are brought about by complexity costs: either communication 
costs rise disproportionately, or the public provider of a service and the users of the same 
service are too far apart from each other, or a “bureaucratic hydrocephalus“ emerges. Both 
types of economies of scale – positive as well as negative - should, thus, be taken into 
account when assessing the advantages and disadvantages of centralisation from a fiscal 
federalism perspective. 
Big or small  
is beautiful  
Can these criteria of the theory of fiscal federalism be used to outline a kind of "metric" that 
- at least theoretically - allows to clearly identify (i) which of the goods made publicly avail-
able in Europe should actually be provided by the EU itself and (ii) which services should 
definitely (no longer) be provided at the European level? No, it will not be possible to meet 
the high demand for a clear and theoretically well-founded metric. However, much better 
criteria than simple rules of thumb will be found.  
A kind of 
metric… 
A clear and simple metric cannot be adopted because the criteria presented do not all 
apply to one and the same dimension. According to the preceding arguments, a European 
public good (EPG) should:  
…and basic 
criteria for 
EPGs 
 display pan-European benefits. If this is not the case, the minimum requirement for a 
common good provided at the European level should be that its benefits extend well 
beyond the borders of individual Member States. For public goods whose benefits ex-
tend far beyond the EU's borders (e.g. climate protection), the EU is the best possible 
Pan-European 
benefits 
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provider from a European perspective as long as more fiscal equivalence cannot be 
achieved (e.g. by a powerful global actor). 
 display spatially homogeneous preferences of all Europe's inhabitants as a whole. If 
this cannot be guaranteed, spatially homogenous preferences should be clearly identi-
fiable, at least well beyond the borders of individual Member States. 
European 
Preferences 
 be realized most cost-effectively at the European level due to economies of scale. The 
minimum requirement for an EPG in this respect is that the provision through the 
Community cannot be more expensive than the sum of the costs incurred by the indi-
vidual nation states. Moreover, services that can be provided most cost-effectively in 
even more far-reaching international cooperations should be implemented as EPGs as 
long as the perfect cooperations are not feasible. Whenever such collaborations can 
be achieved or are already in place, the EU is the designated representative of the Eu-
ropean partner. 
economies of 
scale at the 
European level 
The theory of fiscal federalism is not about meeting these three criteria all at the same 
time. The criteria are not cumulative. But they are not strictly substitutive either. At least 
one of the criteria should be met if a public good is to be provided at the European level. In 
other words, existing European services, to which none of these three criteria applies, 
should be transferred back - i.e. decentralised - to the Member States as part of an EPG 
strategy. 
The criteria are 
not cumulative 
At the same time, the fulfilment of only one of the above three criteria is a rather weak 
requirement for EPGs, as long as we do not know how it relates to the other two. The three 
criteria concern three different dimensions of the economic analysis; they are incommen-
surable. Since the three criteria do not depend on each other or are not in a fixed 
proportion to each other, no "objective" best compromise can be calculated. If, for a partic-
ular public good, the three criteria point in opposite directions and no clear-cut "pro EPG" 
or "contra EPG" argument is discernible, then one has to resort to what is ultimately al-
ways the decisive factor in multidimensional decisions: a weighing up decision has to be 
made. 
Weighing up the 
three 
dimensions 
How does the economic perspective help in such a weighing up decision? Does the eco-
nomic concept of European public goods still bring added value even when it does not set 
out clear maxims? Two fictional examples may help to answer these questions.  
 First example: In view of economies of scale and potential benefits that can hardly be 
geographically limited to individual Member States, European space travel is likely to 
be confirmed as an EPG on two out of three criteria. But what would happen if the 
preferences of Europeans were to differ spatially so much that parts of the continent 
would have no interest in a Community-funded space programme? Are we in the 
presence of a European public good?  
 Second example: The benefits of securing the EU's Baltic external borders against 
infiltrating irregular troops - such as those that have destabilised eastern Ukraine since 
2014 - vary widely within Europe. Possibly, people's preferences for securing these 
If the criteria 
point in different 
directions... 
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borders show a similar East-West pattern5. On the other hand, the economies of scale 
associated with securing these borders via defence policy - especially the guarantee of 
credible deterrence – clearly speak for a cohesive and common solution, as the one 
offered today by the transatlantic alliance. How much longer could these security ser-
vices still be regarded as a European (or transatlantic) common good if surveys on 
their benefits and polls on people’s preferences were to produce a different picture? 
Both examples illustrate that clear-cut "pro EPG" or "contra EPG" decisions – without giv-
ing up at least one criterion - are unlikely. Such constellations will occur frequently in the 
case of European public goods; that much prognosis can be dared. At the end of an as-
sessment of whether a public service should be provided at the European level, a political 
decision for or against an EPG represents the decision of the democratically legitimate 
holders of public responsibility. If the criteria do not clearly point in the same direction, a 
weighing up is necessary. 
However, both examples also illustrate that such a weighing up should not be done at the 
beginning. It should form, in the end, the basis of an informed decision. As soon as it be-
comes apparent that the basic fiscal federalism criteria do not lead to a direct conclusion, 
questions arise as to more and better information: How different are the preferences for 
space travel exactly? How is the defence benefit, which in the second example hypotheti-
cally declines moving from East to West, operationalised? Such questions can often not be 
answered without further ado. They call for an analytical, and, if possible, empirical in 
depth examination. Ideally, a cost-benefit analysis should determine the European added 
value of a public good tested for "Europeanisation".  
... one must drill 
deeper and look 
more closely 
A study by the Bertelsmann Foundation conducted such an exercise in 2013 (Bassford et 
al., 2013). To this end, it laid down two criteria for public spending at the EU level: „ For 
one, it should entail positive net benefits, i.e. the benefits should exceed the costs of public 
spending.” This is a low-threshold requirement that is common to common goods and pub-
licly provided services, as described above in Section C. „Second, it should entail 
European added value (EAV) of public spending, i.e. the net benefits of public spending at 
the European level should be larger than those at the national level. In other words, EAV 
essentially compares the net benefits of spending by national governments with those that 
arise from spending in the same category at the European level. In this sense, added val-
ue is technically the difference between the net benefits of spending at the EU level and 
the national level.” The concept of European added value, which is here defined in ex-
penditure terms, can also be applied by analogy to public goods and services that are not 
implemented through fiscal instruments but primarily through regulatory instruments. 
European 
added value 
meets... 
  
 
                                                     
5  Indeed, a recent Pew Research Center survey (Fagan and Poushter, 2020) recorded quite heterogenous preferences across the 
populations of NATO members regarding a military response in favour of the allies to a hypothetical Russian attack. Spatial patterns 
play only a minor role here, however. In addition to the remarkable differences in the willingness to engage with neighbouring countries, 
the survey also reveals a further weakness of the unbalanced military partnership in NATO: among all European members of NATO the 
preference of the respective populations for military assistance in favour of allied neighbouring Member States lies well below the 
expectation that the US would take over this defence. In many countries these differences are small, but in some countries they are 
strikingly large. In Germany, for example, only a third of those surveyed advocate for a deployment of their own Bundeswehr; almost two 
thirds expect the US forces to come to the aid of Germany's neighbours. In Italy, Greece and Spain these differences are even more 
pronounced. 
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In the case of a European public good, this added value, expressed as the greater net 
benefit at EU level, is to be understood as the result of pooling together the findings for the 
three basic criteria discussed above. Thinking things through, the performance of a Euro-
pean solution in terms of spillovers, preference heterogeneity and economies of scale 
must be compared with the respective performance of the national solution. The resulting 
three "partial net benefits" are then added up to a "total net benefit". If the latter is positive, 
European added value exists.6 But this is very theoretical.  
The derivation of a total net benefit will often not suceed. As illustrated above, the three 
basic criteria for European public goods can rarely be summarized into a single dimension 
without an evaluative decision having to be made.  
 
...the three 
basic criteria 
The added value of a conceptual justification for European public goods and of a systemat-
ic weighing up of costs and benefits does not primarily lie in the fact that objective, purely 
scientific judgments are passed. It lies in the fact that the evaluative decision is not made 
up front, but only at the end – after the pros and cons have been discussed on the basis of 
consistent and, for all parties involved, clear criteria. 
The added 
value of looking 
for European 
added value... 
It goes without saying that the criteria presented here in abstract terms can still not meet 
the demand for great clarity. The practical implementation of the abstract criteria in relation 
to concrete tasks is a key step in the process aimed at bringing public goods more to the 
fore of European activities and further integration. Apart from the inherently important claim 
to justify the transfer of public tasks to the European level as well as possible, there are 
above all political arguments for it.  
 
Indeed, shifts in competence are inevitably also a matter of balance of power. The federal 
level, which is to hand over tasks, will experience such a cutback in competences as a loss 
of power - and will tend to resist it. Conversely, the government level for which an expan-
sion of tasks is being envisaged are often assumed to be motivated primarily by power 
considerations. Especially when it comes to the transfer of tasks to the European level, this 
reproach is the rule rather than the exception. It should be noted here: in itself, the compe-
tition between different federal levels for the fulfilment of certain tasks and for the 
associated political influence and the required resources is a healthy sign of a lively demo-
cratic constitution. But, the competing will to power does not provide any criterion as to 
how tasks are to be distributed. If the balance of power is decided solely on the basis of 
power considerations, existing structures are usually preserved. Even if - for example in a 
major crisis - tasks can be allocated according to purely political calculations, this alone is 
no guarantee that the new balance of power will be better than the old one in the medium 
and long term. Here, the fiscal federalism criteria for or against the Europeanisation of 
common goods, which are to be specified in each individual case, offer independent yard-
sticks. They, thus, create transparency in situations that would otherwise be perceived - 
and wrongly dismissed - as "turf war". 
... does not 
always lie in 
waterproof 
results, but 
rather in political 
transparency. 
                                                     
6  This approach differs from the one in Bassford et al. (2013). By applying the idea of Bassford et al. (2013) to EPGs, we deviate from the 
procedure presented therein. Bassford et al. (2013) propose to first determine a total benefit of Member State implementation and a total 
benefit of European implementation and then to compare the two quantities in order to derive the net benefit. Science is thus called 
upon to make an evaluative decision that it should actually not make itself. We, on the other hand, assume that a "total benefit" can 
hardly ever be measured in view of the three incommensurable basic criteria. The necessary evaluative decision is made here more 
transparent and left to the legitimized politicians.  
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The criteria-based examination is not only of scientific interest. It can also be politically 
decisive in separating relevant from non-relevant fields of action and in identifying the wel-
fare-enhancing solution in political stalemate situations. Given the discussed need to make 
weighing up decisions at the end, if the criteria do not allow to reach a clear-cut conclu-
sion, special attention must be paid to the balance of the test procedure. In particular, it 
should be avoided to conduct the criteria-based examination as a one-sided "test for Euro-
peanization" of a task. If a public service can possibly be provided better or more efficiently 
at the European level, the "burden of proof" should not lie solely in the concept of Europe-
an public good. After all, for the reasons outlined above, evidence beyond all reasonable 
doubt can rarely be expected from the outset in the face of multi-layered criteria, which are 
not always clearly measurable. Setting the bar so high just for a change in the allocation of 
tasks artificially favours the status quo. This, of course, applies to issues of centralisation 
as well as to issues of decentralisation. Such a bias in favour of the status quo can easily 
be avoided; it is only important to observe the following maxim: the fiscal federalism criteria 
for the best level of provision of a particular public service are not to be used primarily as 
objective criteria; they are to be understood in relative terms. In other words, a state task 
should not only be regarded as a European common good when the EPG criteria prove 
this to be the case. It is sufficent if, in comparing the EU level and the Member State level, 
the same criteria show sufficiently clearly - although not necessarily "unambiguously" - that 
the central level is better suited than the national level to fulfil the task concerned. 
Balance of the 
procedure, no 
one-sided 
burden of proof 
E. The expenditure of the European Union 
On its website, the German Bundestag uses an old catchphrase to define the federal 
budget: the budget is the "government programme in figures". Taking up this perspective, 
one could argue that the fulfilment of EU tasks is reflected on the expenditure side of the 
EU budget.  
The EU budget is adopted every year jointly by the European Parliament and the Council 
of the European Union on the basis of a proposal from the European Commission. How-
ever, the budget is part of a multiannual financial framework (MFF), which sets the 
maximum annual amounts that the EU can spend in each policy area. The current MFF 
covers the seven years from 2014 to 2020. At the end of May 2020, the European Com-
mission presented an ambitious proposal for the next multiannual financial framework 
2021-2027, which featured significant changes compared to previous multiannual financial 
frameworks. To a large extent, these changes are due to the coronavirus pandemic, its 
implications and the countermeasures taken by the Union. Nevertheless, the Commis-
sion’s proposal also envisaged substantial spending increases in policy areas with 
characteristics of European public goods - for example Digital Europe, Horizon Europe or 
the InvestEU facility. The political compromise reached by the European Council in July 
2020 has in turn cut some of these very EPG-expenditures. Such a decision has been 
criticised by the European Parliament, which must ultimately give its consent to the MFF 
as well. Whether and to what extent the final multiannual financial framework will strength-
en European common goods is therefore still an open question.  
"Government 
programme in 
figures“ 
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Thus, in our view, the actual EU budget of the last "pre-coronavirus-year” (2019) offers a 
solid basis for characterising the established structures of European task fulfilment. Total 
expenditure of the 2019 EU budget amounts to 148.2 billion euros, about 0.9 percent of 
the EU's statistical gross national income (GNI) and about 2 percent of total public ex-
penditure in the EU.7 Thus, the EU budget remains well below its ceiling: the total own 
resources used to finance the EU budget may not exceed 1.2 percent of aggregate GNI.8 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of 2019 EU expenditure across the six policy areas under-
lying the current MFF. 
 
0.9 percent  
of GNI 
 
 
 
Agricultural policy and economic, social and territorial cohesion policy together account 
for 61 percent of all EU spending. Although the funds allocated to the Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP) have been significantly reduced over the years, they still make up 
29 percent of the total budget.9 
61 percent for 
agricultural policy 
and cohesion policy 
Around 20.5 billion euros were spent on "Competitiveness for growth and employ-
ment". This policy area covers, inter alia, large infrastructure projects (2.1 billion 
euros), the Common Strategic Framework for Research and Innovation (11.3 billion 
euros), the Erasmus+ programme for education, youth and sport (2.6 billion euros) and 
 
                                                     
7  EU annual budgets distinguish between two types of appropriations: in addition to the payments considered here (money actually paid 
out in a given year), they specify, in parallel, the so-called commitments (funding that can be agreed in contracts in a given year). In 
2019, the latter exceed the former. Total commitments of the 2019 EU budget were set at 165.6 billion euros (= 1.0 percent of GNI). 
8  The expenditure of the Union is also well below the central government expenditure of federal states, which on average accounts for 
more than 50 percent of general government expenditure (Cottarelli, 2016; Caiumi, 2019). 
9  In figure 3: 75.11 percent out of 38.7 percent. 
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the Connecting Europe infrastructure facility (1.7 billion euros). A further 9.4 billion 
euros was used to finance EU external actions, including pre-accession aid, European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the Development Cooperation Instrument. The remaining 
expenditure is incurred in the areas "Administration", "Security and citizenship" and 
"Other" (special instruments in response to unforeseen events and crises).  
Do these spending items correspond to European public goods? For such broadly 
defined policy areas, it is not always possible to make direct assessments. As will be 
illustrated in the next Section, the public finance literature identifies quite a few ser-
vices in the EU budget that would be better classified as regional or even local public 
goods. 
Are these EPGs? 
With a view to the Union's actual task profile, however, the sustainability of the popular 
approach among public finance policy-makers and scholars to equate the budget with 
the government programme (i.e. with the material objects of European policy), must 
first be examined. The catchphrase "government programme in figures" is correct, but 
incomplete. Politics - especially European politics - is far from being implemented sole-
ly through fiscal instruments. Looking only at money gives a partial and thus distorted 
picture. 
Looking at money 
alone can be 
misleading 
This becomes just as visible in European foreign policy as in European "domestic poli-
cy". In European foreign policy, joint initiatives on development and security issues are 
also reflected in EU expenditure. But in traditional foreign policy, which operates 
through diplomatic activities and international agreements, "more Europe" does not 
automatically mean more European spending - at least not proportionally more spend-
ing. The intensity and ultimately the success of a common EU foreign policy can only 
be gauged to a limited extent by how much money is spent on it. 
More foreign policy 
without more 
money 
A similar situation can be observed in the case of domestic policy. Here, too, there are 
key European policies that are implemented without clear spending counterparts. This 
applies first and foremost to the area of so-called "negative integration", in particular 
the safeguarding of the four fundamental freedoms of the internal market: the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital. These freedoms - by their very 
nature undoubtedly European public goods - are of the utmost importance for the func-
tion and self-image of the European Union. However, their impact on the European 
budget is, at best, a weak echo of such importance. After all, the fundamental free-
doms are implemented primarily through regulation, not through expenditure. 
The four 
fundamental 
freedoms as 
European common 
goods 
But even in the realm of "positive integration" - where the expansion of European pub-
lic goods is often recommended (see Section F) - equating areas of expenditure with 
fields of EU action would be incomplete, sometimes even misleading. 
Positive integration 
without expenses... 
This can be well illustrated by the example of climate protection. As already mentioned 
above, climate protection is a global public good. In the absence of an assertive world 
parliament, it is – as a second-best solution - clearly a European public good. In the 
field of climate protection, as with almost all environmental protection, the polluter pays 
principle (Art. 191 TFEU) should apply. Policy instruments enforcing the polluter pays 
principle are taxes, levies and certificate trading on the one hand, and conditions and 
... exemplified by 
climate protection 
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regulations on the other hand. Public spending on climate protection follows, instead, 
the burden-sharing principle, the opposite of the polluter pays principle. It is certainly 
true that there are scenarios in which climate protection subsidies may also represent 
an economically sensible choice of instrument. But this is the exception. Instruments 
that address climate protection burdens and obligations in a way that is compatible 
with the polluter pays principle can normally be regarded as superior. These superior 
instruments of the common good "climate protection", however, are not at all reflected 
in the EU budget when they take the form of regulations. As levies or certificates, they 
affect the revenue side of the budget. Thus, if EU spending on climate protection in-
creases, is that good news or bad news from the point of view of European public 
goods? 
This does not mean that a budget-oriented analysis in the context of EPGs is superflu-
ous. The EU budget is a reference point in those areas where policy is implemented 
via fiscal instruments. Such guidance is also valuable insofar as there is no compara-
ble measurability of European engagement in the field of legislative and administrative 
regulation. Nevertheless, it is important for a consistent EPG policy based on the effi-
cient use of instruments to always be aware of the limited explanatory power of the EU 
budget, so as to avoid otherwise obvious misconclusions. 
EU budget still 
provides important 
guidance for the 
development of 
EPGs 
F. Europeanisation and decentralisation of public tasks 
in the light of European public goods 
If one considers the current catalogue of EU tasks in the light of the theory of fiscal 
federalism, it becomes evident that its components can only in part be justified on eco-
nomic grounds (Heinemann, 1999; Caesar, 2006). 
 
The most important policy areas in the budget - CAP and cohesion policy - do not dis-
play clearly recognisable characteristics of a European public good (Fuest et al., 
2015). The CAP maintains high subsidies and import duties for an industry that today 
contributes very little to the EU's gross economic value added (less than two percent). 
However, its actors represent a politically influential interest group in key member 
states. Cohesion policy finances numerous local projects in countries that do not need 
EU support - such as, for example, in Germany the rehabilitation of drinking water res-
ervoirs in Brandenburg, the conversion of brownfield sites in Nürnberg or support for IT 
investments by small and medium-sized enterprises in Baden-Württemberg (Fuest et 
al., 2015). 
CAP and cohesion 
policy: no EPGs 
While the promotion of economic and social cohesion in economically strong countries 
is often identified as a public service that would be better implemented at the national 
or regional level, the same policy in economically weak countries is rather viewed as 
an area of European engagement (see also Figure 4). Here, two perspectives come 
together: if regional and structural policy, by their very nature as goods, are not re-
garded as European common goods, then there is no distinction between rich and 
poor. This is a redistribution issue: if a public good can best be provided at the national 
level, but the nation state lacks the economic or fiscal strength to do so, the efficient 
solution is a fiscal equalisation scheme that addresses this problem at its roots. Effi-
Regional policy: 
national public 
goods plus fiscal 
equalisation 
European Public Goods: Their contribution to a strong Europe | Page 23 
 
cient decentralisation of the present EU regional and structural policy involves both 
economically strong and weak member states, supplemented by a centrally organised 
financial equalisation scheme (Thöne, 2017). 
On the other hand, the Union’s catalogue of tasks neglects components with a more 
obvious European character (Heinemann, 2016). In defence policy, for example, Eu-
rope could achieve economies of scale through enhanced cooperation - possibly even 
joint armed forces – and, thus, ensure defence capability at lower costs. In migration 
policy, EU involvement could correct inefficiencies resulting from uncoordinated na-
tional implementation in combination with cross-border negative/positive externalities. 
In foreign policy as well as in the case of large investment projects (e.g. trans-
European networks) only a European activity could create the conditions for an ade-
quate fulfilment of the tasks. Following the initial experiences with national responses 
to the coronavirus pandemic, European epidemic prevention and control is now also in 
the spotlight. 
Many candidates 
for more EPGs 
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Figure 4 gives an overview of the findings and recommendations of central studies and 
contributions on both sides of the discussion: the Europeanisation of services with an 
EPG character and the decentralisation of those services provided at the European level, 
which, by virtue of their impact, are rather national or even regional public services. Giv-
en that the discussion about European public goods has gained considerable momentum 
since 2019 - and now again with the coronavirus pandemic - these findings must be re-
garded as preliminary. Furthermore, not all of the assessments presented here rely on a 
differentiated criteria-based analysis, as characterized above in Section B. 
 
From the perspective of economic theory, the EU is too focused on local or regional pub-
lic goods. An increased provision of European public goods by the EU would be 
desirable. An argument often put forward for such an imbalance is that local public goods 
lead to visible benefits in individual Member States, while the benefits of providing EU-
wide public goods are less directly visible (e.g. Fuest et al., 2015). Indeed, decisions on 
the budget are taken by national governments in the Council and by directly elected 
members of the European Parliament. These political actors have an incentive to primari-
ly implement programmes that benefit their voters. Local public goods offer an attractive 
"value for money" in politico-economic terms, as their provision is focused on the respec-
tive constituency, but is financed through the "common pool" of the EU budget. This 
allows Member States to improve their net balance position – i.e. the difference between 
the contributions paid to finance the EU budget and the transfers received from the 
budget – vis-à-vis the EU (HLGOR, 2016). 
Causes of the 
undesirable 
developments 
The division of tasks between the EU and the Member States has grown historically. 
Although the Commission recommended already in the early 1990s to use "European 
added value" as a benchmark for the reform of the EU budget, the veto power of deci-
sion-makers following a "juste retour" logic has led to this problematic division of labour 
between government layers.  
"Juste retour" logic 
The key question is then: how can the distorted incentives be corrected? Bordignon and 
Scabrosetti (2016) argue that a reform of the revenue system can help to promote the 
provision of "genuine" European public goods. In particular, they advocate the introduc-
tion of an EU tax10 paid directly by the citizens to the EU budget. Such budget financing 
could impose greater accountability upon the EU institutions. However, it would entail a 
dynamic political strengthening of the Union vis-à-vis the Member States, which in turn 
could trigger opposition from the Member States and thus hamper reforms. 
Do EU taxes help? 
Heinemann (2016), on the other hand, doubts that new sources of revenue can steer the 
incentives of budgetary decision-makers in the desired direction (see also Osterloh et al. 
2008). To address the problem of too local spending priorities, he maintains that reforms 
are needed which directly increase the relative attractiveness of European public goods 
over local projects with local impact.  
Or can EPGs be made 
directly more attractive 
for policy-makers? 
                                                     
10  Possible options for an EU tax proposed in the literature are: CO2 tax (European Commission, 1992 and 2011; Macron, 2017), fuel taxes 
(Thöne, 2016), electricity tax (Konrad, 2016), digital tax (European Commission, 2017), financial transaction tax along the lines of the 
British stamp duty (Macron, 2017). 
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These include strategies "which (a) directly try to make the benefits of EPG more visible, 
(b) increase the costs of local goods relative to EPG, or (c) strengthen those actors in the 
budgetary process who have a less parochial perspective"11. 
G. Prospects and open questions 
As has become apparent, the concept of European public goods is actually a very old 
approach. For several decades now, economists have repeatedly resorted to the theo-
ry of fiscal federalism when assessing the task profile of the European Union - and 
previously that of the European Community - in terms of its efficiency and future orien-
tation. Against this background, it is all the more pleasing, that an eminently political 
discussion, no longer confined to academic circles, is emerging today. This recognises 
the implementation of precisely more European public goods as the way to revitalise 
the - at times weak - European integration. In place of defensive reaction patterns in a 
debate paralysed by Brexit and other populist movements, a productive counter-image 
of a more European Europe becomes discernible, which through a clever exchange of 
tasks and competences between Member States and the Union can ideally strengthen 
both sides. 
A more European 
Europe 
Yet, this new great interest in European public goods also makes plain that many open 
questions still need to be answered and many approaches still need to be further de-
veloped, if the convincing idea of new integration via European public goods is to be 
translated into effective practice. At times, it also takes a willingness to break with pos-
sibly cherished old habits and to openly address – if necessary, overcome - some of 
the taboos that have always been carefully avoided. With the coronavirus pandemic 
and the subsequent surge, at all levels, in the need and willingness to make and im-
plement bold decisions, the chances of real progress even on structural European 
issues increase. 
New interest,  
open questions,  
old habits and  
a taboo 
Of the interesting questions that are relevant to the further discussion, we will touch 
here upon three selected aspects, which are important from today’s perspective: (1) 
the governance issues associated with the catchword “connectivity”; (2) conditions for 
more European public goods already with the multiannual financial framework 2021-
2027; (3) the alleged taboo of treaty revision. Without denying the current dominance 
of the manifold problems brought about by the coronavirus pandemic, these are issues 
that were already central before Covid-19 - and are even more so "with Covid-19". 
Three dimensions 
of the upcoming 
discussions  
(1) Realize “connectivity”, by implementing European public goods in and with the 
Member States. As has become apparent, the paradigm of European public goods can 
prove to be a strong driver for further European integration. However, this will indeed 
be the case only if the theoretical concept of public goods is confronted with the Euro-
pean reality in two respects. On the one hand, the abstract concept must be filled with 
policy tasks that are demonstrably more effective if carried out at the European level 
Implement EPGs 
with the Member 
States 
                                                     
11  With regard to point (c), Fuest et al. (2015) suggest that the MFF should only set the total amount of the EU budget. Decisions on the 
use of the funds (up to a fixed ceiling) are entirely left to the annual budgetary procedure with its joint decision-making by the Council 
and the Parliament. 
Page 26 | European Public Goods: Their contribution to a strong Europe 
 
rather than at the Member State level, i.e. policy areas with a "European added value". 
Impulses are provided by the research findings summarised in Section F, which should 
be deepened by means of concrete case studies. On the other hand, it must be clari-
fied how the implementation of European tasks in a multi-level context can be 
realistically approached and which governance issues arise.  
As far as the first point is concerned, the present paper shows that the scientific and 
political discussion is already productively under way. The issue here is how "Europe 
can deliver" - to use the title of the Bertelsmann Foundation study by Berger et al. 
(2017) - by optimizing tasks in line with the EPG concept. But this first step does not 
yet adequately answer the very question of how Europe can deliver. The doctrine of 
public goods, applied to the allocation of tasks within the European multi-level system, 
is implicitly based on a clear division of tasks among levels of government ("dual fed-
eralism"): each level of government regulates its own tasks, finances them from its own 
resources and also implements them itself. This concept, however, does not fit well 
with European reality. 
 
 
Dual federalism is 
not a model for 
Europe 
For some coomon goods, such an American-style separation of spheres may be the 
optimal solution in the long term. For many other European public goods, however, it is 
not a sensible solution to concentrate the decision-making, administration and financ-
ing competences all at the European level. On the one hand, the EU has hardly any 
on-site administrative structures of its own. On the other hand, it must also be asked 
whether the provision of EPGs should only be considered when an original European 
financing option is at hand. 
Even in long-established federal states, there is often no textbook separation between 
the three dimensions (decision-making competence, administration competence and 
financing competence). Various forms of vertical cooperation take its place. Some are 
cooperative, others clearly hierarchical. German federalism, which is at times de-
scribed as very closely intertwoven, provides ample evidence on how public goods are 
regulated, financed and provided within multi-level governance systems. 
Vertical cooperation 
is typical for Europe 
This issue is addressed here under the heading of the principle of connectivity, which 
marks a particularly sore point of emerging conflicts in the cooperation across levels of 
government. Where vertical cooperation takes the form of a higher level defining tasks 
and a lower level implementing those tasks, governance and financing must be linked 
in such a way that adequate financing and incentives for cost-effective conduct are 
simultaneously taken into account. This is not easy to achieve. In the vertically cooper-
ative federal state of Germany, compliance with or violation of the principle of 
connectivity is a constant source of conflict between government levels. The persistent 
difficulties in controlling the cohesion funds give also Europe a taste of the necessary 
debate. 
Connectivity marks 
a sore point of 
emerging conflicts 
In German federalism, these issues culminate in different perspectives on the so called 
principle of connectivity: causal connectivity ("who orders, pays") as the politically in-
centive-compatible principle is here in conflict with the execution connectivity ("Who 
implements, pays") as its administratively incentive-compatible counterpart. The term 
connectivity may sometimes be familiar only to experts. The problems resulting from 
Problems of 
missing connectivity 
are more present 
than the term 
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inadequately implemented connectivity, on the other hand, can quickly become exis-
tential for entire levels of government. This applies not only to the administrative and 
financial capacity, but also to its democratic acceptance. The European refugee crisis 
of the years 2015 and 2016 provided a vivid example. 
The explicit issue of connectivity and the related design and governance issues are still 
rather alien to the relationship between the Union and its Member States. This will 
have to change with more European public goods. It is necessary to further explore 
this “second thought” - following the discussion of European public goods - in econom-
ic, institutional and governance terms. 
The understandig of 
EPG may still 
change in the light 
of vertical 
cooperation 
Finally, such an analysis can also lead to a new perspective on European public goods 
themselves: if one assumes that, despite all connectivity problems, many EPGs can be 
sensibly implemented only by partial or complete delegation of the administrative exe-
cution “downwards”, some of the regulatory tasks of the present Union may well 
appear in a new light. 
(2) Preparations and negotiations on the multiannual financial framework 2021-
2027 had been rather slow for some time when the coronavirus pandemic brought all 
relevant processes to a standstill at the beginning of 2020. However, the thread was 
quickly resumed. At the end of May 2020, the Commission presented the guidelines of 
its new and, under coronavirus conditions, substantially expanded proposal for a multi-
annual financial framework 2021-2027. On 21 July 2020, the European Council agreed 
on a 1,074 billion euro multiannual financial framework, which will continue to be pri-
marily financed through the EU's GNI-based own resources. At the same time, EU 
leaders also agreed on a 750 billion euro recovery fund to be financed through market 
borrowing by the European Commission. For the Commission to tap markets, the own 
resources ceiling will be temporarily increased from the current 1.2 percent to 2 per-
cent of EU members’ GNI. In order to repay the capital raised by the Commission 
early, the Council plans to introduce new own resources. 
 
Much of the envisaged expenditure increase is related to the management of the 
Covid-19 crisis. The financial leeway for EU common goods, on the other hand, has 
shrunk considerably compared to the Commission’s proposal of May 2020. And the 
latter - without wanting to diminish its strengths - was already not a very broad agenda 
for implementing European public goods. This makes the remaining task all the greater 
now: a strengthening of European integration through more and/or better European 
public goods should already be pursued during the next MFF period. This is not just a 
"nice to have" desideratum; it is an essential prerequisite for the strengthening of Eu-
rope, both internally and externally, to become a reality. Common good perspectives, 
which can only be reflected in the subsequent financial framework from 2028 onwards, 
come too late in terms of global politics: the multipolar world is not waiting for the Eu-
rope of a 2028-2035 MFF. 
EPGs cannot wait 
for the 2028-2035 
MFF 
The developments towards the MFF 2021-2027 so far are both intentional and prob-
lematic. Public budgets develop in an evolutionary way. They should (and must) not 
make any radical changes if they are to fulfil their democratic and constitutional func-
tions. However, normal budgets cover one year, the multiannual financial framework 
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seven years. Despite all the merits of the medium-term concept, the desired predicta-
bility and discipline of the MFF will, when it comes to EPGs and their deeper European 
understanding, above all become an obstacle to developing Europe faster and more in 
line with its challenges than in the seven-year cycle. 
Against this background, the options to make the 2021-2027 MFF "EPG-compatible" 
within a realistic framework must be explored. Shortly after the Council meeting, the 
European Parliament threatened to reject the multiannual financial framework in its 
present form. Among other things, it criticised cuts to future-oriented programmes. 
However, whether the European Parliament in the current situation will actually delay 
the vote on the Council Decision is questionable. Probably only small changes are still 
to be expected. Hence, one of the central tasks in the future will be to explore also 
options for making the MFF more flexible and to clarify to what extent European public 
goods can also be implemented alongside the MFF. It will have to be discussed to 
what extent more flexibility is an essential prerequisite for an EPG-oriented “politicisa-
tion” of the European budget and which mechanisms can be used to still ensure the 
integrity of the European budget. 
EPG-compatible, 
flexible MFF? 
(3) The taboo of treaty change: Without an amendment of the European treaties, a 
strategy to consistently strengthen European public goods cannot be pursued. Both 
the tasks to be centralised at the European level and the tasks to be transferred from 
the European level back to the Member States will, in the vast majority of cases, hardly 
be feasible without Treaty amendments. A project that regards European common 
goods as the key European perspective is thus inevitably a project that entails a far-
reaching revision of the European Constitution.  
EPGs require 
Treaty changes 
This observation is as obvious at the end of this paper as it is problematic for the pro-
cess. Indeed, hardly any assessment is more widely accepted than the one that treaty 
changes are politically completely unimaginable. Under the European political constel-
lation of 2019, this was a realistic assessment. Whether this will change as a result of 
the coronavirus pandemic and its consequences in 2020 and 2021 is not foreseeable. 
It still seems that treaty change can easily become the proverbial "elephant in the 
room", whose presence dominates everyone's perception, but which no one really 
addresses. The problem is not concealed, but nobody really talks about it either. Obvi-
ously, this is not a solution. At the same time, this representation as “EPG paradox” 
leads to excessive pessimism. 
The elephant  
in the room 
In the long term, the treaties will indeed have to be amended. In the short and medium 
term this is difficult, though, after the coronavirus experience, it is no longer unimagi-
nable. On the one hand, the opportunities for strengthening European public goods 
without treaty change lie in a stronger framework-giving function for Member States’ 
activities (see Calliess, 2019). Here, one will have to weigh up whether EPGs with 
regulation by the Member States is perceived more as part of a future-oriented Union - 
or as an expression of the old "Brussels is meddling everywhere"-cliché. On the other 
hand, options must be explored pursuing more EPG integration alongside the Europe-
an treaties rather than within them, as is the case, for example, with the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
Short- and medium- 
term options for 
more EPGs needed 
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Thus, the goal of strengthening European public goods ultimately leads to the question 
of which measures are realistically conceivable for all members of the Union and which 
measures are more likely to be achieved through flexible integration, e.g. through a 
"Europe of clubs". It may sound contradictory at first to want to strengthen Europe by 
not strengthening it for all. But even from the economic concept of European public 
goods it does not follow that the best possible framework for a European common 
good must always be the post-Brexit EU 27. 
Politically, it is always desirable that any integration is a truly community act. This 
would be all the more desirable as the Corona crisis, through border closures and 
sometimes very nationally oriented reactions, has not brought this Europe so much 
closer together as one might expect from a jointly experienced disaster. But the wish 
will often enough remain a wish. Pragmatically, however, it is rather a positive, be-
cause more realistic, vision for Europe to restrict further integration to those who want 
it and not to involve those who do not want it. In a European Union that has learned its 
lessons from Brexit, it should be easy today to acknowledge this simple fact. This 
opens the way to think about European public goods with creative optimism, to discuss 
them in a participatory manner and finally to implement them for as many European 
citizens as possible in their Member States. 
EPGs need  
flexible integration  
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